A simplified variant of Kurt Gödel's modal ontological argument is presented. Some of Gödel's, resp. Dana Scott's, premises are modified, others are dropped, and modal collapse is avoided. The emended argument is shown valid already in quantified modal logic K. The presented simplifications have been computationally explored utilising latest knowledge representation and reasoning technology based on higher-order logic. The paper thus illustrates how modern symbolic AI technology can contribute new knowledge to formal philosophy and theology.
Introduction
Variants of Kurt Gödel's [1970] , resp. Dana Scott's [1972] , modal ontological argument have previously been analysed and verified on the computer by Benzmüller and Woltzenlogel [2014; 2016] and Benzmüller and Fuenmayor [2020] , and even some unknown flaws were revealed in these works. 1 In this paper a simplified and improved variant of Gödel's modal ontological argument is presented. This simplification has been explored in collaboration with the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL [Nipkow et al., 2002] , while employing 2013] shallow semantical embedding (SSE) approach as enabling technology. This technology supports the reuse of automated theorem proving (ATP) tools for classical higher-order logic (HOL) to represent and reason with a wide range of non-classical logics and theories, including higher-order modal logic (HOML) and Gödel's modal ontological argument, which are in the focus of this paper.
The new, simplified modal argument is as follows. Gödel's definition of a Godlike entity remains unchanged (P is an uninterpreted constant denoting positive properties):
A Godlike entity thus possesses all positive properties. 1 E.g., the theorem prover LEO-II detected that Gödel's [1970] variant of the argument is inconsistent; this inconsistency had, unknowingly, been fixed in the variant of Scott [1972] ; cf. [Benzmüller and Woltzenlogel Paleo, 2016] for more details on this.
The three single axioms of the new theory are 2 where the following defined terms are used (∀ is a possibilist quantifier and ∀ E is an actualist quantifier for individuals):
Informally we have: A1' Self-identity is a positive property, self-difference is not. A2' A property entailed or necessarily entailed by a positive property is positive. A3 The conjunction of any collection of positive properties is positive. (Technical reading: if Z is any set of positive properties, then the property X obtained by taking the conjunction of the properties in Z is positive.) From these premises it follows, in a few argumentations steps in base modal logic K, that a Godlike entity possibly and necessarily exists. Modal collapse, which expresses that there are no contingent truths and which thus eliminates the possibility of alternative possible worlds, does not follow from these axioms. These observations should render the new theory interesting to formal philosophy and theology.
Compare the above with Gödel's premises of the modal ontological argument (we give the consistent variant of Scott): 2 An alternative to A1' would be: The universal property (λx. ) is a positive property, and the empty property (λx.⊥) is not.
The third-order formalization of A3 given here has been proposed by Anderson and Gettings [1996] , see also Fitting [2002] . Axiom A3, together with the definition of G, implies that being Godlike is a positive property. Since supporting this inference is the only role this axiom plays in the argument, (P G) could be (and has been; cf. Scott [1972] ) taken as an alternative to our A3; cf. the Appendices A-C.
arXiv:2001.04701v5 [cs.LO] 11 Feb 2020
Necessary existence (N E) and essence (E) are defined as (the other definitions are as above):
Informally: property Y is the essence of an entity x if, and only if, (i) Y holds for x and (ii) Y necessarily entails every property of x. Moreover, an entity x has the property of necessary existence if, and only if, the essence of x is necessarily instantiated.
We also give informal readings of Gödel's axioms: A1 says that one of a property or its complement is positive. A2 states that a property necessarily entailed by a positive property is positive, and A3 is as before. A4 expresses that any positive property is necessarily so. A5 postulates that necessary existence is a positive property. Axiom B (symmetry of the accessibility relation associated with modal -operator) is added to ensure that we are in modal logic KB instead of just K. 3 Using Gödel's premises as stated it can be proved that a Godlike entity possibly and necessarily exists [Benzmüller and Woltzenlogel Paleo, 2014] . However, as is well known [Sobel, 1987] , modal collapse is implied; see also Fitting [2002] and Sobel [2004] for further details on this. Benzmüller and Fuenmayor [2020] showed that different modal ultrafilter properties can be deduced from Gödel's premises. These insights are key to the new argument presented in this paper: If Gödel's premises entail that positive properties form a modal ultrafilter, then why not turning things around, and start with an axiom U1 postulating ultrafilter properties for P? Then use U1 instead of other axioms for proving that a Godlike entity necessarily exists, and on the fly explore what further simplifications of the argument are triggered. This research plan worked out and it ultimately led to the new modal ontological argument presented above.
The proof assistant Isabelle/HOL and its integrated ATP systems have supported our exploration work surprisingly well, despite the undecidability and high complexity of the underlying logic setting. As usual, we here only present the main steps of the exploration process, and various interesting eureka and frustration steps in between are dropped.
Paper structure: An SSE of HOML in HOL is introduced in Sect. 2. The foundations outlined there ensure that the paper is sufficiently self-contained; readers familiar with the SSE approach may simply skip it. Modal ultrafilter are defined in Sect. 3. Section 4 recaps the Gödel/Scott variant, and then an ultrafilter-based modal ontological argument is presented in Sect. 5. This new argument is further simplified in Sect. 6, leading to our new proposal based on axioms A1', A2' and A3 as presented above. Related work is mentioned in Sect. 7. Further variants are presented in the Appendix.
Since we develop, explain and discuss our formal encodings directly in Isabelle/HOL, some familiarity with this proof assistant and its underlying logic HOL [Andrews, 2002; Benzmüller and Andrews, 2019] is assumed. The entire sources of our formalization are presented and explained.
Sections 2 and 3 have been adapted from [Benzmüller and Fuenmayor, 2020] and [Kirchner et al., 2019] .
Modeling HOML in HOL
Related work focused on the development of various SSEs, cf. Kirchner et al., 2019] and the references therein. These contributions, among others, show that the standard translation from propositional modal logic to first-order (FO) logic can be concisely modeled (i.e., embedded) within HOL theorem provers, so that the modal operator , for example, can be explicitly defined by the λterm λϕ.λw.∀v.(Rwv → ϕv), where R denotes the accessibility relation associated with . Then one can construct FO formulas involving ϕ and use them to represent and proof theorems. Thus, in an SSE, the target logic is internally represented using higher-order (HO) constructs in a theorem proving system such as Isabelle/HOL. Benzmüller and Paulson [2013] developed an SSE that captures quantified extensions of modal logic. For example, if ∀x.φx is shorthand in HOL for Π(λx.φx), then ∀xP x would be represented as Π (λx.λw.P xw), where Π stands for the λ-term λΦ.λw.Π(λx.Φxw), and the gets resolved as above.
To see how these expressions can be resolved to produce the right representation, consider the following series of reductions:
Thus, we end up with a representation of ∀xP x in HOL. Of course, types are assigned to each (sub-)term of the HOL language. We assign individual terms (such as variable x above) the type e, and terms denoting worlds (such as variable w above) the type i. From such base choices, all other types in the above presentation can actually be inferred.
An explicit encoding of HOML in Isabelle/HOL, following the above ideas, is presented in Fig. 1 . 4 In lines 4-5 the base types i and e are declared. Note that HOL comes with an inbuilt base type bool, the bivalent type of Booleans. No cardinality constraints are associated with types i and e, except that they must be non-empty. To keep our presentation concise, useful type synonyms are introduced in lines 6-9. σ abbreviates the type i⇒bool (⇒ is the function type constructor in HOL), and terms of type σ can be seen to represent worldlifted propositions, i.e., truth-sets in Kripke's modal relational semantics [Garson, 2018] . The explicit transition from modal propositions to terms (truth-sets) of type σ is a key aspect in SSE technique, and in the remainder of this article we use of phrases such as "world-lifted" or "σ-type" terms to emphasize this conversion in the SSE approach. γ, which stands for e⇒σ, is the type of world-lifted, intensional properties. µ and ν, which abbreviate σ⇒σ and σ⇒σ⇒σ, are the types associated with unary and binary modal logic connectives.
The modal logic connectives are defined in lines 11-24. In line 16, for example, the definition of the world-lifted ∨-connective of type ν is given; explicit type information is presented after the ::-token for 'c5', which is the ASCIIdenominator for the (right-associative) infix-operator ∨ as introduced in parenthesis shortly after. ϕ σ ∨ ψ σ is then defined as abbreviation for the truth-set λw.(ϕ σ w) ∨ (ψ σ w), respectively. In the remainder we generally use bold-face symbols for world-lifted connectives (such as ∨) in order to rigorously distinguish them from their ordinary counterparts (such as ∨) in meta-logic HOL.
Further modal logic connectives, such as ⊥, , ¬, →, and ↔ are introduced analogously. The operator , introduced in lines 22, is inverting properties of types γ; this operation occurs in some Gödel's axiom A1. = and = are defined in lines 23-24 as world-independent, syntactical equality. The already discussed, world-lifted modal -operator is introduced in lines 19-20; accessibility relation R is now named r. The definition of ♦ in line 21 is analogous.
The world-lifted (polymorphic) possibilist quantifier ∀ as discussed before is introduced in line 27. In line 28, userfriendly binder-notation for ∀ is additionally defined. Instead of distinguishing between ∀ and Π as in our illustrating example, ∀-symbols are overloaded here. The introduction of the possibilist ∃-quantifier in lines 29-30 is analogous.
Further actualist quantifiers, ∀ E and ∃ E , are introduced in lines 33-37; their definition is guarded by an explicit, possibly empty, existsAt (@) predicate, which encodes whether an individual object actually "exists" at a particular possible world, or not. These additional actualist quantifiers are declared non-polymorphic, and they support quantification over individuals only. In the subsequent study of the ontological argument we will indeed apply ∀ and ∃ for different types in the type hierarchy of HOL, while we use ∀ E and ∃ E only for quantification over individuals.
Global validity of a world-lifted formula ψ σ , denoted as ψ , is introduced in line 40 as an abbreviation for ∀w i .ψw.
Consistency of the introduced concepts is confirmed by the model finder nitpick [Blanchette and Nipkow, 2010] in line 43. Since only abbreviations and no axioms have been introduced so far, the consistency of the Isabelle/HOL theory HOML as displayed in Fig. 1 is actually evident.
In line 44-47 it is studied whether instances of the Barcan and the converse Barcan formulas are implied. As expected, both principles are valid only for possibilist quantification, while they have countermodels for actualist quantification. Theorem 1. The SSE of HOML in HOL is faithful for base modal logic K.
Proof. Follows [Benzmüller and Paulson, 2013] .
Theory HOML thus successfully models base modal logic K in HOL. To arrive at logic KB the symmetry axiom B as shown earlier can be postulated.
Modal Ultrafilter
Theory ModalUltrafilter, see Fig. 2 , imports theory HOML and adapts the topological notions of filter and ultrafilter to our modal logic setting. For an introduction to filter and ultrafilter see the literature, e.g., [Burris and Sankappanavar, 1981] .
Modal ultrafilter are introduced in lines 18-19 as worldlifted characteristic functions of type (γ⇒σ)⇒σ. A modal ultrafilter is thus a world-dependent set of intensions of γtype properties; in other words, a σ-subset of the σ-powerset of γ-type property extensions. An ultrafilter φ is defined as a filter satisfying an additional maximality condition: ∀ϕ.ϕ ∈ φ ∨ ( −1 ϕ) ∈ φ, where ∈ is elementhood of γ-type objects in σ-sets of γ-type objects (see line 4), and where −1 is the relative set complement operation on sets of entities (line 9).
A filter φ, see lines 12-15, is required to 1. be large: U ∈ φ, where U denotes the full set of γ-type objects we start with, 2. exclude the empty set: ∅ ∈ φ, where ∅ is the worldlifted empty set of γ-type objects,
be closed under supersets
Benzmüller and Fuenmayor [2020] have studied two different notions of modal ultrafilter (called γand δ-ultrafilter) which are defined on intensions and extensions of properties, respectively. This distinction is not needed in this paper; what we call modal ultrafilter here corresponds to their γ-ultrafilter.
Gödel's Modal Ontological Argument
The full formalization of Scott's variant of Gödel's argument, which relies on theories ModalUltrafilter and HOML, is presented in Fig. 3 . Line 3 starts out with the declaration of the uninterpreted constant symbol P, for positive properties, which is of type γ⇒σ. P is thus an intensional, worlddepended concept.
The premises of Gödel's argument, as already discussed earlier, are stated in lines 5-24. 5 An abstract level "proof net" for theorem T6, the necessary existence of a Godlike entity, is presented in lines 26-34. Following the literature the proof goes as follows: From A1 and A2 infer T1: positive properties are possibly exemplified. From A3 and the defn. of G obtain T2: being Godlike is a positive property (Scott actually directly postulated T2). Using T1 and T2 show T3: possibly a Godlike entity exists. Next, use A1, A4, the defns. of G and E to infer T4: being Godlike is an essential property of any Godlike entity. From this, A5, B and the defns. of G and N E have T5: the possible existence of a Godlike entity implies its necessary existence. T5 and T3 then imply T6.
5 Remark: whether we use actualist or possibilist quantifiers for individuals, e.g., in the defns. of or T4 turned out irrelevant in this paper, and we consistently use actualist quantifiers in the remainder. The six subproofs and their dependencies have been automatically explored using state-of-the-art ATP system integrated with Isabelle/HOL via its sledgehammer tool; sledgehammer then identified and returned the abstract level proof justifications as displayed here, e.g. "using T1 T2 by simp". The mentioned proof engines/tactics blast, metis, simp and smt are trustworthy components of Isabelle/HOL's, since they internally reconstruct and check each (sub-)proof in the proof assistants small and trusted proof kernel. Using the definitions from Sect. 2, one can also reconstruct and formally ver-ify all proofs with pen and paper directly in meta-logic HOL. 6 The presented theory is consistent, which is confirmed in line 37 by model finder nitpick; nitpick reports a model (not shown here) consisting of one world and one Godlike entity.
Validity of modal collapse (MC) is confirmed in lines 40-47; a proof net displaying the proofs main idea is shown.
Most relevant for this paper is that the ATP systems were able to quickly prove that Gödel's notion of positive properties P constitutes a modal ultrafilter, cf. lines 50-57. This was key to the idea of taking the modal ultrafilter property of P as an axiom U1 of the theory; see the next section.
Ultrafilter Modal Ontological Argument
Taking U1 as an axiom for Gödel's theory in fact leads to a significant simplification of the modal ontological argument; this is shown in lines 16-28 in Fig. 4 : not only Gödel's axiom A1 can be dropped, but also axioms A4 and A5, together with defns. E and N E. Even logic KB can be given up, since K is now sufficient for verifying the proof argument.
The proof is similar to before: Use U1 and A2 to infer T1 (positive properties are possibly exemplified). From A3 and defn. of G have T2 (being Godlike is a positive property). T1 and T2 imply T3 (a Godlike entity possibly exists). From U1, A2, T2 and the defn. of G have T5 (possible existence of a Godlike entity implies its necessary existence). Use T5 and T3 to conclude T6 (necessary existence of a Godlike entity).
Consistency of the theory is confirmed in line 31; again a model with one world and one Godlike entity is reported.
Most interestingly, modal collapse MC now has a simple countermodel as nitpick informs us. This countermodel consists of a single entity e 1 and two worlds i 1 and i 2 with r = { i 1 , i 1 , i 2 , i 1 , i 2 , i 2 }. Trivially, formula Φ is such that Φ holds in i 2 but not in i 1 , which invalidates MC at world i 2 . e 1 is the Godlike entity in both worlds, i.e., G is the property that holds for e 1 in i 1 and i 2 , which we may denote as λe.λw.e=e 1 ∧ (w=i 1 ∨ w=i 2 ). Using tuple notation we may write G = { e 1 , i i , e 1 , i 2 }.
Remember that P, which is of type γ⇒σ, is an intensional, world-depended concept. In our countermodel for MC the extension of P for world i 1 has the above G and λe.λw.e=e 1 ∧ w=i 1 as its elements, while in world i 2 we have G and λe.λw.e=e 1 ∧ w=i 2 . Using tuple notation we note P as
In order to verify that P is a modal ultrafilter we have to check whether the respective modal ultrafilter conditions are satisfied in both worlds. U ∈ P in i 1 and also in i 2 , since both { e 1 , i 1 , e 1 , i 2 }, i 1 and { e 1 , i 1 , e 1 , i 2 }, i 2 are in P; ∅ ∈ P in i 1 and also in i 2 , since both {}, i 1 and {}, i 2 are not in P. It is also easy to verify that P is closed under supersets and intersection in both worlds. 6 Reconstruction of proofs from such proof nets within direct proof calculi for quantified modal logics, cf. Kanckos and Woltzenlogel-Paleo [2017] or Fitting [2002] , is ongoing work. Note that in our countermodel for MC, also Gödel's axiom A4 is invalidated. Consider X = λe.λw.e=e 1 ∧ w=i 2 , i.e., X is true for e 1 in i 2 , but false for e 1 in i 1 . We have P X in i 2 , but we do not have (P X) in i 1 , since P X does not hold in i 1 , which is reachable from i 2 .
nitpick is capable of computing all partial modal ultrafilters as part of its countermodel exploration: out of 512 candidates, nitpick identifies 32 structures of form F, i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, in which F satisfies the ultrafilter conditions in the specified world i. An example for such an F, i is
F is not a proper modal ultrafilter, since F fails to be an ultrafilter in world i 1 .
Simplified Modal Ontological Argument
What modal ultrafilters properties of P are actually needed to support T6? Which ones can be dropped? Experiments with the computer confirm that, in modal logic K, the filter conditions from Sect. 3 must be upheld for P, while maximality can be dropped. It is possible to merge condition 3 (closed under supersets) for P with Gödel's A2 into A2' as shown in line 18 of Fig. 5 . Moreover, instead of requiring the universal set/property U = λx. to be a positive property, we postulate that self-identity λx.x=x, which is extensionally equal to U, is in P. Analogously, we replace ∅ = λx.⊥ in ultrafilter condition 2 for P by self-difference λx.x =x. Self-identity and self-difference have been used frequently in the history of the ontological argument, which is part of the motivation for this switch. Filter condition 4 is now implied by the theory. In summary, it is sufficient to ensure that P is a filter, and this is what our simplified axioms do. Now, from the definition of G (line 13) and the axioms A1', A2' and A3 (lines 17-19) theorem T6 immediately follows: in line 22 several theorem provers integrated with sledgehammer report a proof in about one second when running the experiments on a standard notebook. Moreover, a more detailed "proof net" is presented in lines 23-28; the proof argument is analogous to what has been discussed before.
Consistency is confirmed by nitpick in line 31, and a counter model (similar to the one discussed in the previous section) is reported to MC in line 34.
In lines 37-45 further questions are answered experimentally: neither A1, nor A4 or A5, of the premises we dropped from Gödel's theory are implied anymore. Also Monotheism is not implied (line 42); by postulating A1 it can be enforced. In lines 44-45 we see that P is a filter, but no ultrafilter. Since some of these axioms, e.g. the strong A1, have been discussed controversially in the history of Gödel's argument and since also MC is independent, it is justified to claim that we have arrived at a philosophically and theologically potentially relevant simplification of the modal ontological argument.
Related Work
Fitting [2002] has suggested to carefully distinguish between intensions and extensions of positive properties in the context of Gödel's modal ontological argument, and, in order to do so within a single framework, he introduces a sufficiently expressive HOML enhanced with means for the explicit representation of intensional terms and their extensions; see also the intensional operations used by Fuenmayor and 2020] in the course of their verification of the work of Fitting and Anderson.
The application of computational methods to philosophical problems was initially limited to first-order theorem provers. Fitelson and Zalta [2007] used PROVER9 to find a proof of the theorems about situation and world theory in [Zalta, 1993] and they found an error in a theorem about Plato's Forms that was left as an exercise in [Pelletier and Zalta, 2000] . Oppenheimer and Zalta [2011] discovered, using Prover9, that one of the three premises used in their reconstruction of Anselm's ontological argument (in [Oppenheimer and Zalta, 1991] ) was sufficient to derive the conclusion. The first-order conversion techniques that were developed and applied in these works are outlined in some detail in [Alama et al., 2015] .
More recent related work makes use of higher-order proof assistants. Besides the already mentioned work of Benzmüller and colleagues, this includes Rushby's [2018] study on Anselm's ontological argument in the PVS proof assistant and Blumson's [2017] related study in Isabelle/HOL.
Conclusion
Gödel's modal ontological argument stands in prominent tradition of western philosophy. The ontological argument has its roots in the Proslogion (1078) of Anselm of Canterbury and it has been picked up in the Fifth Meditation (1637) of Descartes and in the works of Leibniz, which in turn inspired and informed the work of Gödel.
In this paper we have linked Gödel's theory to a suitably adapted mathematical theory (modal filter and ultrafilter), and subsequently we have developed a significantly simplified modal ontological argument that avoids some axioms and consequences in the new theory, including modal collapse, that have led to criticism in the past.
While data scientists apply subsymbolic AI techniques to obtain approximating and rather opaque models in their application domains of interest, we have in this paper applied modern symbolic AI techniques to arrive at sharp, explainable and verifiable models of the metaphysical concepts we are interested in. In particular, we have illustrated how state of the art theorem proving systems, in combination with latest knowledge representation and reasoning technology, can be fruitfully utilized to explore and contribute new knowledge to theoretical philosophy and theology.
Further variants of the simplified ontological argument are presented in this appendix. They show that axiom A3 can be replaced by T2 (cf. footnote 2) and that A2' can be further simplified into A2" A property entailed by a positive property is positive. The latter has the consequence that T3, the possible existence of a Godlike entity, is no longer implied due to an undesired countermodel, which can again be fixed by postulating modal axiom T.
Obviously, also axiom A1' could be replaced by A1" The universal property is a positive property, the empty property is not. We leave it to the reader to choose his personally preferred technical variant of the simplified modal ontological argument as introduced in this paper.
A Postulating T2 instead of A3
Instead of working with third-order axiom A3 to infer T2, we directly postulate T2 as an axiom of the theory. This variant of the simplified modal ontological argument is displayed in Fig. 6 . Theorem T6 can be proved as before: from A1' and A2' we get T1 (positive properties are possibly exemplified); from T1 and T2 we infer T3 (possible existence of a Godlike entity); from A1', A2' and T2 obtain T5 (the possible existence of a Godlike entity implies its necessary existence); combining T3 and T5 have T6 (the necessary existence of a Godlike entity).
B Simple Entailment in Axiom A2'
Instead of using a disjunction of simple entailment and necessary entailment in axiom A2' we may in fact only require simple entailment in A2'; see axiom A2" in line 15 of Fig. 7 . A proof for T6, the necessary existence of a Godlike entity, and also T7, the existence of a Godlike entity, can still be found (lines 19-20) . However, after replacing A2' by A2", T3 (the possible existence of a Godlike entity) is no longer implied; see line 23. T3 now has an undesired countermodel (not depicted here) which consists of one single world that is not connected to itself. However, when assuming modal ax- iom T (what is necessary true is true in the given world), this countermodel is eliminated, see lines 25-26.
C Simple Entailment in Modal Logic T
The above discussion motivates the following, final alternative of the simplified modal ontological argument; see also Fig. 8 . This argument, which is formulated in modal logic T (which comes with axiom T as discussed above), has the following axioms; cf. lines 17-19 in Fig. 8 : A1' Self-identity is a positive property, self-difference is not.
A2" A property entailed by a positive property is positive. T2 Being Godlike is a positive property.
The proof argument as used before is applicable: from A1', A2" and modal axiom T deduce T1 (positive properties are possibly exemplified, line 24); from T1 and T2 infer T3 (possible existence of a Godlike entity, line 25); from A1', A2" and T2 obtain T5 (the possible existence of a Godlike entity implies its necessary existence, line 26); combining T3 and T5 have T6 (the necessary existence of a Godlike entity, line 27). 
